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The Decline of Bureaucrats and the Rise of Feudal Democracy in Japan?
1. Introduction.

The bureaucracy has historically influenced Asian politics and Japan is no exception. The
relationship between the bureaucracy and polity is central to Japanese history and politics. Many
authors have written on this relationship, but since the 1970s a wave of pluralist views dominated
writing on Japanese politics (Fukui, 1977; Allinson, 1989). Pluralist' s writing emerged in reaction
to an earlier tradition of legalistic writing as well as the image of Japan as a monolithic elitist society
caricatured as "Japan Inc." Pluralists emphasize the differentiation of bureaucracy from the polity,
the fragmentation of private interests and the fluidity and processual nature of Japanese politic.
Pluralist scholars are most at home examining informal individual or interactional processes (e.g.
interest group struggles, negotiations, etc.) and making inferences from micro to macro levels of
analysis. However, their optimism about pluralism, democracy and a meritocratic basis for political
participation tends to de-focalize the structural linkages between the bureaucracy and polity (Alford
and Friedland, 1985 ; Schwartz, 1998).
Another strand of literature has developed alongside the pluralists. This literature focuses
on the Japanese State and policy and is characterized as the "managerial" or "statist" paradigm
(Allison, 1971; Alford and Friedland, 1985 ; Schwartz, 1998). Managerial views are counter posed
to explanations of Japanese politics based on cultural uniqueness, unilinear developmental models
(cf. Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995) and pluralists' notion of influence as individual and fluid .
Sometimes they focus on specific ministries (Okimoto, 1989; Johnson, 1982) and the internal
structure of the state and its societal relations (Evans, 1995 ; Pempel, 1998). Thus, the home domain
for the managerialist is either at the level of the Japanese State or a specific ministry of the state. The
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conceptual vision of managerialists is so abstract and essentialistic that they often rely on simple
correspondences, neglecting or obscuring the specific relationships between the bureaucracy and
polity. Thus, for reasons internal to the paradigms, both groups of scholars tend to "de-focalize" the
relationship between the bureaucracy and polity.
Although current scholarly writing may be organized around the pluralist-managerialist
paradigms (Fukui, 1977; Muramatsu and Krause, 1984; Allinson, 1989; Keehn, 1990; Kerbo, 1996;
Schwartz, 1998), paradigmatic distinctions often revel in questions, principles, levels of analysis and
methodology to the neglect of concrete empirical demonstration of substantively important issues.
Both paradigms share one central question: Is the Japanese polity ensconced in a monolithic elite
power structure or is Japan a pluralistic democracy with a plurality of interest groups and mass
participation? Basic to this question is the empirical examination of the relationship between the
bureaucracy and polity. Differentiation and independence of the two is a necessary structural
presumption of the pluralist arguments. Integration and cohesion is a necessary presumption of the
managerial arguments. A critical indicator of the differentiation or integration of the bureaucracy and
polity is chii riyo. Chii riyo is the movement of retiring bureaucrats into political office (Thayer,
1969; Johnson, 1974). High profile political positions into which ex-bureaucrats move include:
prime ministership, cabinet membership, and the elected positions of the Lower House of the Diet.
Although pluralists and managerialists differ in their interpretations of chii riyo, neither provides
systematic empirical foundations for their interpretations
To move beyond the presumptions held by both pluralists and managerialists, this paper
examines the patterns of chii riyo politicians since WWII. We sketch the basic parameters of the
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issues of chii riyo. First, we review the predominant views of chii riyo. Second, we discuss the

changing patterns of chii riyo. Third, we examine the educational and family backgrounds of prime
ministers, cabinet members, and Lower House Diet members.
2. Literature.

The importance of chii riyo resides in the question of the changing patterns of elite cohesion
and fragmentation. This is not an issue of cohesion or fragmentation, but the degree and location of
cohesion or fragmentation. Scholars working out of the managerial model postulate a general
cohesion between bureaucratic and political elites (cf. Johnson, 1974; Scalapino, 1968). This
cohesion has been expressed as "fusion" of the two (Pempel, 1998) or "corporate cohesion" of the
state (Evans, 1995). Alternatively, pluralists postulate a general differentiation or cleavage between
the bureaucracy and the polity.

The critical question is : How much pluralism is there in

contemporary Japan? The larger significance of chii riyo for paradigmatic debates may be
understood by a briefreview of the theoretical architecture of managerial and pluralist explanations.
Managerialists focus on relations between the bureaucracy and society or the industrial
policy of specific ministries. They ignore specific internal relations of the state--between the
bureaucracy and the polity. Instead they tend to deductively presume cohesion or a "loyalty of the
rest of the state apparatus" to an autonomous bureaucracy (cf. Evans, 1995:40-41). Okimoto (1989)
and Johnson ( 1982) are so concerned with the examination of MITI policies that they fail to turn
their gaze toward the relation of MITI to the polity, much less the entire ensemble of ministries and
agencies to the polity. Pempel (1998), as the exception, addresses the movement of ex-bureaucrats
to the Diet but provides only anecdotal evidence concerning the LDP. He simply mentions that
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"retired bureaucrats (chii riyo) did poorly in the 1996 Lower House elections ... " (Pempel, 1998:
141) as evidence of the breaking of LOP power in the mid-1990s. However, Pempel points to the
election results as evidence of the weakness of the LDP and does not implicate the election results
in terms of the cohesion between the bureaucracy and LDP. In addition, he cites only one election
out of the context of the historical pattern. Our research indicates that his characterization of the
1996 election is at best misleading (discussed below) and those chii riyo representatives in the Diet
were stable throughout the 1990s.
Pluralist interpretations of Japanese politics have been on the ascendancy since the 1970s in
Japan and the 1980s in the United States (Fukui, 1977; Allinson, 1989). Pluralists provide evidence
that Japanese politics is not dominated by a small group of elites (bureaucrats or politicians). Rather,
they view the central government as an arena of contested political power (Allinson, 1989; Schwartz,
1998). In addition, they show that political decisions involve a wide range of elites and non-elites.
Allinson (1993) exemplifies the optimism of the fully developed pluralist argument by
presuming the emergence of fragmented sectionalism and subgovernments as the larger structural
context with which to view the decline of chii riyo as evidence for a "dispersal of power." He
contends that Japan has undergone a structural transformation from the early postwar decades. This
change represents "a steadily more competitive polity" in the 1980s and 1990s (Allinson, 1993: 1749). The structural fragmentation resulted from economic expansion, and led to the financial
enfranchisement of "economic citizenship" and the increasing political participation of the Japanese
people. The fragmentation also resulted from an increasing number of interest groups (a surrogate
for economic citizenship) which were themselves the outcome of economic expansion. Thus, chii
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riyo politicians, in the 1950s and 1960s, dominated the prime ministership, key cabinet posts and
major leadership positions in the private sector. However, according to Allinson (1993:3), the issue
is the development of "skills and talent" where by the 1970s ex-bureaucrats (chii riyo) were almost
"shut out of top positions in favor of men groomed from within. "
Allinson claims that changes in these larger patterns led to greater merit-based competition
among politicians and corresponding erosion of the advantages based on career connections to the
bureaucracy as in chii riyo. His evidence comes from the decline of chii riyo politicians from top
political positions (prime minister and cabinet) corresponding to the rise of zoku politicians (policy
specialists). Allinson's pluralist optimism stems from a loose correspondence between the decline
in chii riyo politicians, the increased recognition of zoku politicians, and the presumption of a
corresponding increase in the merit-based recruitment and promotion within the LDP.
In sum, the literature takes the relationship between the bureaucracy and polity out of direct
systematic empirical focus. The pluralists, based on their individual-level analysis, see pluralistic
democracy in the rise of professional politicians operating in small group negotiation processes
within an inferred context of substantial differentiation between bureaucratic and political elites and
fragmentation within these institutions. Managerialist's concern for state-society relations or the
industrial policy of particular ministries leads them to ignore bureaucracy-polity relations or to
deductively presume a coherent cooperative integration between the two. Managerialist's assertions
of an abstract state essence (e.g. , developmental state, capitalist state, etc.) imply a coherence and
unity to state structures that rarely if ever occur (Hooks, 1999). We contend that the relationship
between the bureaucracy and polity is an empirical issue, not an assumption supported only with

6
sketchy data, anecdotes and assertions.
3. Explanations of the Changing Pattern of Chii riyo.
The notion of the decline of chii riyo has led to several alternative and somewhat
complementary explanations suggesting different points of change: the rise of the zoku politician;
generational changes in faction leaders; the increasing enforcement of the LDP seniority system; and
the rise of the hereditary politician. We review the notion of the demise of chii riyo in more detail.
The primary pluralist interpretation of chii riyo politicians is that their importance has eroded
because of the rise of zoku giin (tribe politicians). The rise of zoku giin has changed the balance of
relations between politicians and bureaucrats since the late 1960s (Uchida, 1993; Sato and
Matsuzaki, 1986; Park, 1986; Mabuchi, 1997; Richardson, 1997).
A second explanation of the decline of chii riyo politicians focuses on a generational change
in faction leaders within the LDP. Curtis (1988:81) points out that the patron-client relationship
between factional bosses and their followers became weaker in the 1980s due to a generational
change in the leaders. Gone are those entrepreneurial old-line party bosses who built the factions .
In the early post war period the factions were smaller and more numerous. Each faction involved
the inner core of loyal followers marked by a s'trong oyabun-kobun (patron-client) relationship
whereby the faction leader provided political funds and access to party posts in return for support
and votes. A third factor believed to have led to the decline of chii riyo is the increasing importance
of career time within the LDP. The bureaucracy "was the primary recruiting ground for the party
leadership" between 1955-80 and there was considerable room for "the fast-track." In the early post
war period several chii riyo politicians were able to start political careers in their mid-40s, after a

7
first career in the bureaucracy and still become prime minister. Since the early 1970s, or the Tanaka

Prime Ministership, the accelerated career track has almost been eliminated. There is little or no
credit for time served in the bureaucracy, upper house or local political office (e.g. governorship),
as had been routine practice in the earlier period. LDP party members were all required to move up
the same seniority ladder (Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986). Today, it takes 25-30 years of career
experience in party politics to rise to the level of prime ministership. This suggests the possibility
of seeking a second career in high political positions for any bureaucrat almost unlikely.
A fourth interpretation of the decline of the chii riyo politician involves the corresponding
rise of the hereditary politician. Hereditary politician (seshu giin) means a politician who 'inherited'
their family's wealth (kaban), reputation (kanban), and political network and social organization
(jiban) . These resources are then directly converted into election to office.

Yet, technically,

hereditary politicians include: adopted sons, sons-in-law; even nephews and brothers. The rise of
the hereditary politician builds on the previous explanation (Uchida, 1993; Rothacher, 1993) . . The
increasing enforcement of the seniority rules within the LDP, coupled with the decentralization of
political fund raising, has contributed to the success of home grown hereditary politicians.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the literature on the decline of chii riyo reveals at least
three weaknesses. First, the so-called decline of chii riyo is based primarily on the backgrounds of
prime ministers and tends to ignore cabinet and Diet members. Second, the explanations for the
decline of chii riyo are based on correspondence with the occurrence of some other political
phenomena. There is no demonstration of a causal link (cf. zoku and hereditary politicians). Third,
the explanations appear to be constructed by working backwards from the presumed decline of chii
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riyo to make inferences back to an event (1976 law) or presumed events (generation changes and
strict enforcement of seniority in the LDP). The decline of chii riyo is neither demonstrated, nor are
there any compelling causal explanations. We will investigate chii riyo patterns among prime
ministers, cabinets, Diet and LDP members and the correspondence with changes in other
institutional patterns to suggest some other explanations.

4. Results
To examine the notion of the demise of chii riyo we have assembled data at three top
positions: prime ministers, cabinet posts, and the Lower House LDP memberships over selected time
points since WWII. This design allows the identification of the degree of cohesion or fragmentation
and to discuss the degree and location of "fusion" between the bureaucracy and polity and their
implications for pluralists and managerial positions. In addition, we examine two other related
features of the politician's background: graduation from Tokyo University (Todai) and family
background (hereditary politicians).
Table 1 lists the names, dates and duration in office, age at election to the prime rninistership
and career and family backgrounds of all post-war prime ministers. There have been 24 prime
ministerships, and of those 24, nine were chii riyo, retired bureaucrats, representing 37.5%. These
nine prime ministerships (8 prime ministers) held office for almost 28 , out of the 54, years since
Yoshida' s first prime ministership or over 52% of the time period covered ( 1946-1999). If the
placement and tenure of ex-bureaucrats to the prime ministership is an indication of the cohesion of
the bureaucracy and polity, then the influence of chii riyo politicians is significant.
However, it is the pattern of change over this period that is the issue. In the last 20 years,
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since Suzuki's election in 1980, only one prime minister had a background in the bureaucracy, Kiichi
Miyazawa. In contrast, between 1946 and 1980, seven ex-bureaucrats occupied eight prime
ministership, serving 320 months out of 409, or 78% of the time. From 1980 to the present, a period
of 20 years, there was only one chii riyo prime minister, Miyazawa, serving less than 10% of the
total time, 21 months. Thus, the data support the notion that chii riyo politicians are declining among
prime ministerships.
In addition, Table 1 shows the number of years each prime minister served in the Diet before
they took office and their age at the time of appointment to the prime ministership. The issue of the
increasingly strict enforcement of the LDP seniority system has been argued to relate to the decline
of chii riyo. Before Tanaka, prime ministers averaged less than 15 years experience in the Diet.
From Tanaka's prime ministership, the average experience has more than doubled to thirty years.
Miyazawa, the only chii riyo politician to become prime minister in the 1990s, left the bureaucracy
at the age of 34 and then spent 3 8 years in the Diet before becoming prime minister at the age of 72.
This changing seniority profile suggests more limited possibilities for chii riyo politicians to gain
the prime ministership. Data in Table 1 support the notion of increasing strictness of the LDP
seniority system.
The pattern of prime ministers since WWII also illustrates the importance of benefiting from
coming from a political family. The LDP's enforcement of a seniority system places a premium on
starting young and on the use of money and political resources. The access to existing political
resources in the family (money, organization, and reputation) mitigates obstacles for new politicians.
It is striking in Table 1 that almost fifty percent of the post war prime ministers came from "political
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families." Eleven of 23 prime ministers were hereditary politicians (including brothers). In the last
10 years (since 1989), five of eight prime ministers were hereditary politicians.
Overall, the data in Table 1 do not indicate the hereditary politician has squeezed out the exbureaucrat: Instead, the two categories overlap. Of the eight chii riyo prime ministers, five were
hereditary politicians. This suggests that the benefits of coming from the bureaucracy were
compounded with the advantages of inheriting the money, organization and reputation of family
politicians. These two institutional features do not support the notion that there is any necessary
inverse relationship between chii riyo and hereditary politicians
The examination of a third institution (educational background) may shed light on the pattern
of chii riyo and hereditary politicians becoming prime minister. Six of the eight post-war chii riyo
prime ministers were Todai graduates. Little however may be drawn of any pattern over time. The
institutional mechanisms of Todai graduation as a dominant credential of top politicians have
declined with a corresponding diversity of educational background of prime ministers. Pedigree was
not the same after Tanaka.
Next we examine the pattern of chii riyo politicians occupying cabinet positions. Table 2
provides a summary of the cabinet posts. The lkecla cabinet of 1963 is the peak administration for
chii riyo representation with 11 chii riyo politicians out of 21 positions or 52.4% of the cabinet.
Subsequently, the percentage of ex-bureaucrats declined to a low of20% in 1998.
In addition, one might note a similar decline in the percentage of Todai graduates on the
cabinets, from a high of 61.9% in 1963 to a low of28% in 1998. This declining percentage of Todai
graduates mirrors the pattern we noticed in Table 1 on the prime ministers.
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In addition, Table 2 summarizes the percent of hereditary politicians in each of the cabinets
we sampled. Both "second generation" and "family politician" categories represent the same pattern.
In the Yoshida cabinet of 1953, only two of twenty (10%) of the cabinet members were hereditary
politicians. By the Obuchi cabinet of 1998, eleven of twenty five members (44%) of the cabinet
members were hereditary politicians. The four intervening cabinets indicate an incrementally
increasing representation of hereditary politicians at the level of cabinet members.
Taken together, Table 2 suggests there has been a dramatic structural shift in background
characteristics of cabinet members. The decline of ex-bureaucrats, along with the decline of Todai
graduates, suggest that the elite Todai and ex-bureaucrat tracks into politics are on a definite decline
at the level of the cabinet. At the same time, hereditary politicians are on the rise in their
representation on these cabinets.
The next table compares patterns of chii riyo, Todai graduates and hereditary politicians for
the Lower House LDP members. Table 3 shows LDP members and their background characteristics
for the elections of 1953, 1967, 1972, 1983 and 1993. We supplemented our data with estimates
from other sources to better identify patterns. What we see in Table 3 is not a decline in chii riyo.
Looking down the column headed "chii riyo," we see a steady percentage of ex-bureaucrats as LDP
Diet members from 19 53 to 1993. According to our calculations, LD P Diet members with
bureaucratic backgrounds ranged from a high of 22.1 in 1993 to 18% in 1953. Though not presented
here, our examination of the percentage of chii riyo for all Lower House members reflects a similar
stability over time.
Turning to educational background in Table 3, the percentage of Todai graduates among
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LDP members was 24.4% in 1953. In 1993, the percentage ofLDP members graduating from Todai
was 23%. Between these elections, the highest level of Tokyo University graduates occurred in 1967
when fully one-third of all LDP members were alumni. If we consider the entire post war period,
graduates of Todai are relatively stable, but spiked up between 1967 and 1983 elections.
The last column of Table 3 represents the percentage of Lower House LDP members with
backgrounds of hereditary politicians. In 1953, we see 6.4% of LDP members were hereditary
politicians. In 1993, we see 39% ofLDP Diet members were hereditary politicians. Between these
two elections is a consistent increase over time. Other sources indicate the same pattern but suggest
slightly higher percentages. Data in Table 3 indicate a high and increasing concentration of
hereditary politicians from LDP members within the Lower House.
Table 4 shows the ministry of origin for LDP members for selected post-war years. From
Table 3, we saw that the percentage of ex-bureaucrats is steady. Table 4 suggests that the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) is the most represented. Home Ministry was by the far the largest supplier ofchii
riyo in the 1950s and 1960s. The Home Ministry was the largest ministry until GHQ broken it into

several ministries. MITI and Agriculture show signs of increase over time. The patterns of increase
for MOF, MITI and Agriculture contradict those who say the rise of the zoku politician has
diminished the need for x-bureaucrat's information and technical skills (Kawakita, 1989; Mabuchi,
1997).
Table 4 also illustrates that the fusion of the bureaucracy and polity is based on only a few
ministries. In the case of chii riyo, MOF , Home Ministry, MITI, Foreign Affairs, and Agriculture
are important sources of positions. These five ministries accounted for 77% (51 of 66) of chii riyo
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Diet politicians overall and 80% (40 or 50) for LDP Lower House members in 1993 . Taking the
broader view, we see that MOF, Home Affairs, MITI, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture accounted
for 73 % (220 of 302) of all chii riyo politicians in the Lower House for those selected years. The fact
that only a handful of ministries produce chii riyo politicians illustrates the problem of managerialist
discussions of the state and its relations. As Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) point out:
Indeed, it seems to me that, when you take a close look at what goes on inside what we call
the 'state' you immediately annul most of the scholastic problems that scholars, armchair
Marxists and other speculative sociologists, keep raising about the state .. .. In fact, what we
encounter, concretely, is an ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields (they often take
the empirical form of commissions, bureaus, and boards) within which agents and categories
of agents, governmental and nongovernmental, struggle over this peculiar form of authority
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 111).
Further, Table 4 reveals an unusual overlap of the two background characteristics, particularly for
MOF. Twenty of the 77 (26%) of chii riyo politicians out ofMOF were also hereditary. This overlap
of elite characteristics emanating from MOF supports the notion that elements of elite unity reside
in particular ministries.

Conclusion
We found mixed support for the notion that there has been a decline in chii riyo. The results
depend on the level of political office examined. 'There has been a decline in chii riyo in the post
WWII prime ministerships and cabinet memberships . Even though over 50% of the last 54 years
have had a chii riyo prime minister in office, there was only one ex-bureaucrat prime minister in the
last 20 years. Only five (20%) of the cabinet members in 1998 were chii riyo politicians, down from
over 50% in 1963 . However, we see a stable percentage of chii riyo politicians for LDP Diet
members
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However, what is important is the relative stability of the twin credentials of chii riyo and
Todai graduation as a percentage ofLDP Lower House membership. This result contradicts authors
contending there has been an elimination of chii riyo politicians. At the level of LDP membership
chii riyo and Todai continue to provide cache in the political sphere. It is at this level that there is
a substantial fusion of the bureaucracy and polity. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s the previous fusion
was split at the level of prime minister and cabinet member, but the fusion continued at the levels
of the Lower House LDP membership.
The more dramatic finding is the significant and increasing penetration of hereditary
politicians at the levels of prime minister, cabinet, and LDP Diet members (Lower House).
Hereditary politicians dominate at all these levels of political office. The percentage of hereditary
politicians in the cabinet has steadily risen from 10.5% in 1953 to 44% in 1998. The percent of
hereditary politicians among LDP members paralleled the cabinet rise from 6.4% in 1953 to 39%
in 1993.
Our analysis of chii riyo by the ministry of origin suggests the relative influence of the
different ministries at the level of Lower House membership. Table 4 indicated that over time MOF
and the Ministry of Home Affairs have had far arid away the most chii riyo politicians in the Diet
(Lower House). However, Home Affairs representatives declined, reflecting the break up of the once
dominant ministry. The most recent information indicates that MOF, MITI and Agriculture look as
if they may be better represented in the Diet with their ex-bureaucrats. In this sense, the
operationalization of cohesion between the bureaucracy and polity rests squarely on MOF, MITI,
Agriculture, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. In the specific sense of our findings, five ministries
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provide the basis for claims of ' cohesion'.
At first blush the results of chii riyo and Todai graduates in the prime ministerships and
cabinets appears to lend support to pluralist arguments about the declining influence of bureaucracy
over the political process and an accompanying diversity of the career backgrounds of politicians.
Yet, the increasing rate of hereditary politicians may represent a direct contradiction to pluralist's
notions of diversity and merit. Some contend that the hereditary politician represents the feudal
character of Japan. The inheritance of occupation from one's father is a tradition in Japan usually
associated with physicians and Buddhist priests. Others equate the rise of hereditary politicians with
a modem adaptation to the explosion in election costs. Citing a Washington Post article, Schwartz
(1998:33) reports that the typical Lower House member spent four times as much money on the
election as the average U.S . House representative.

Hereditary politicians receive money,

organization, and reputation from their families as an advantage to win high office. This is the
opposite of pluralistic notions of equality of opportunity and merit suggested by Allinson (1993).
In many ways, the rise of hereditary politicians and the stability of chii riyo politicians are the
nightmare of pluralism, not its validation.
The pluralist concern for chii riyo as anathema to democratic politics, the independence of
the polity and a representation of privilege (compared to merit) may find the rise of hereditary
politicians the petard upon which pluralism may be hoisted. The already high and increasing
percentage of hereditary politicians at the prime minister, cabinet and members of the LDP (Lower
House) is a major challenge to pluralist optimism about democracy in Japan. The rise of hereditary
politicians is a movement toward competition, merit and ' dispersal of power' only in the narrowest
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sense of elite competition. Hereditary politicians do not represent diversity as much as they reflect
money politics and the cohesion of the LDP with private sector interests.
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Table 1
Prime Ministerships since 1946, Japan*
Year/Month/ Day

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Duration Yrs. in
(in mos)
pol. career

1946.5.12 - 1947.5.24
1947.5.24- 1948.3.10
1948.3.10 - 1948.10.15
1948.10.15 - 1954.12.10
1954.12.10 - 1955.12.23
1956.12.23 - 1957.2.25
1957.2.25 - 1960.7.19
1960.7.19 - 1964.11.09
1964.11.9- 1972.7.7
1972.7.7 - 1974.12.9
1974.12.9- 1976.12.24
1976.12.24- 1978.12.7
1978.12.7 - 1980.6.12
1980.7.17-1982.11.27
1982.11.27 - 1987.11.6
1987.11.6 - 1989.6.2
1989.6.3 - 1989.8.10
1989.8.10- 1991.11.5
1991.11.5 - 1993.8.9
1993.8.9 - 1994.4.27
1994.4.28 - 1994.6.29
1994.6.30 - 1996.1.11
1996.1.11-1998.7.30
1998.7.30-

12
10
7
74
24
2
41
52
92
29
24
24
18
46
59
19
2
26
21
8
2
18
31
12

1
20
16
3
39
9
15
11
15
25
37
24
26
33
35
29
29
29
38
22
25
22
33
35

Prime Minister's name

Age**

Shigeru YOSHIDA
68
Tetsu KA TAYAMA
60
Hitoshi ASHIDA
61
61
Shigeru YOSHIDA
Ichiro HATOYAMA 71
Tanzan ISHIBASHI
72
Nobusuke KISHI
61
Hayato IKEDA
61
Eisaku SATO
63
54
Kakuei TANAKA
Takeo MIKI
67
Takeo FUKUDA
71
Masayoshi OHIRA
68
Zenko SUZUKI
69
Yasuhiro NAKASONE 64
Noboru TAKESHITA 63
Sosuke UNO
67
58
Toshiki KAIFU
Kiichi MIYAZA WA 72
Morihiro HOSOKAWA 55
Tsutomu HATA
59
Tomiichi MURAYAMA70
Ryutaro HASHIMOTO 59
Keizo OBUCHI
61

Career background

Yrs. served
In bureau.

Bureaucrat (MF A)

1906-1939

Politician

University Family
graduated background
Tokyo

father-politician

Tokyo

Bureaucrat (MF A)

1912-1932

Tokyo

father-politician

Bureaucrat (MF A)

1906-1939

Tokyo

father-politician

Politician

Tokyo

father-politician

Journalist
Bureaucrat (MCI)*"'* 1920-41

Waseda
Tokyo

brother=E. Sato

Bureaucrat (MOF)

1925-47

Kyoto

Bureaucrat (MOR)#

1938-48

Tokyo

brother=N. Kishi
brothers=politicians

1929-50

Meiji
Tokyo

Businessman
Politician
Bureaucrat (MOF)
Bureaucrat (MOF)

1936-5 I
Interest group (fisheries)

Hitotsubashi
Tokyo Suisan

Politician##

Tokyo

Prefectural assemblyman

Waseda

Politician

grand father-mayor

Politician
Bureaucrat (MOF)

1942-52

Waseda
Tokyo

father-politician

Politician

Sophia

Politician

Seijo

Politician
Politician

Meiji
Keio

father-politician

Politician

Waseda

father-politician

father-politician

• 1955 is the year the Liberal Democratic Party was formed . The party captured the majority in the lower house from 1955 to 1993.
+ Years in political career = the number of years it took to become prime minister after winning the first lower house (or upper house) election.
••Age refers to the age at the beginning of prime ministership.
• • • MCI= Ministry of Commerce and Industry (precursor to MITI).
# Ministry of Railroad (Tetsudo sho ).
## Nakasone was a civil servant (Home Ministry) but left the bureaucracy in 6 years and entered politics when he was 29 years old.

•

Table 2
Summary of Cabinet Members by Background

Prime Minster

1953
Yoshida

1963
Ikeda

1972
Sato

1983
Nakasone

1993
Hosokawa

1998
Obuchi

Size of Cabinet (N)*

20

21

21

23

22

25

N Chii-riyo

5 (25.0%)

11 (52.4%)

7 (33.3%)

6 (26.1%)

6 (27.3%)

5 (20.0%)

N Todai graduates

9 (45.0%)

13 (61.9%)

9 (42.9%)

8 (34.8%)

7 (31.8%)

7 (28.0%)

2 nd generation

2 (10.0%)
2 (10.0%)

2 (9.5%)
3 (14.3%)

2 (9.5%)
3 (14.3%)

5 (21.7%)
7 (30.4%)

6 (27.3%)
6 (27.3%)

10 (40.0%)
11 (44.0%)

Family w/ politicians

Source: Gikai seido kenkyu kai ( 1995). Rekidai Kokkai Giin Meikan and Naigai Associates Inc. (1990). Japanese Statesmen.
* Number refers to cabinet members with valid data. The total number of cabinet members was: 21 in 1953 , 1963 and 1972; 23 in 1983 ; 22 in 1993 ; and 25 in
1998.

Table 3
Chii-riyo, Todai Grauduates and Second generation politicians
among LDP members of the Lower House for selected election years
Election
Dates
1947.4.25
1949. 1.23
1953.4.19

1958.5.22
1967.1.29
1972.12.10
1979.10.7
1983.12.18
1986.7.6
1993.7.18

Data
Source
(I)
(l)
(l)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(l)
(2)
(2)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(2)

LDP
N

120 (Liberal party)
l 06 (Progressive)
261 (L. Democratic)
75 (Democratic)
23 7 (Liberal)
76 (Progressive)
283 (Lib + Prog)*
298
278
282
302
236**
304
297
226

Chii-riyo
17 (14.2%)
8 (7.5%)
44 (16.8%)
13 (17.3%)
58 (24.5%)
14 (18.4%)
51 (18.0%)
79 (26.5%)
56 (20.1%)
56 (19.9%)
79 (26.2%)
51 (21.6%)
70 (23.6%)
67 (22.6%)
50 (22.1%)

Tokyo Univ.
Graduates

Family
Generation
politicians

69 (24.4%)

15 (5.3%)

18 (6.4%)

94 (33.8%)
88 (31.2%)

33 (11.9%)
51 (18 .1%)

52 (18.7%)
68 (24. 1%)

72 (30.5%)
67 (22.6%)

73 (30.9%)
115 (38.7%)

87 (36.9%)

52 (23 .0%)

83 (36.7%)

133 (44.8%)
88 (39.0%)

Source: (l) - Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi (1962). Gendai Nihon no Seito to Seiji. Tokyo: Iwanami
shoten, Appendix Table 3, pp. 2-3 .
(2)- Chikako Usui's calculation based on Kokkai Beman, 1968, 1973, 1984, 1994; and Japanese Statesman
(Nichigai Associates, Inc., 1990).
(3) - Asahi Shinbun, 1986, July 8, p. 9.
(4) - Kenzo Uchida (1989). Gendai nihon no hoshu seiji. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, p. 162.
* There were 309 members of the Liberal and the Progressive Parties but the data were missing for 26 cases. Thus
the percentages were calculated based on 283 (309 minus 26).
** There were 240 LOP members but the data were missing for 4 cases. Thus, the percentages were calculated
based on 236 (240 minus 4).
Second generation (2 nd generation) refers to those politicians who inherited political machineries directly from one 's
parents (including adoptive parents and father-in-laws) . Family politician refers to those who have family
politicians, including spouses, brothers and sisters, uncles,' and grandfathers.

TABLE4
Ministry of Origin for Chii Riyo: Lower House Members
Ministry of Origin

1953

1967

1973

1983

1993

Total

Ministry of Finance
6 (1)*
Home Affairs
22 (1)
MITI
6
Agriculture
3
Foreign Affairs
8 (2)
Transport
3
Labor
0
Posts & Telecommunication 5 (1)
Construction
0
Health & Welfare
0
Police
0
Defense
0
Education
1
other ministries/agencies
2

14 (3)
16 (1)
6
6
4
6
2
1
0
3 (1)
2
1
0
2

17 (4)
14 (3)
3
4 (1)
1
5
3 (1)
5
0
0
0
1
0
4

18 (5)
7 (1)
5 (3)
5 (1)
4 (1)
3
6
0
3
2 (1)
1
1
0
5

22 (7)
5
10 (1)
9 (1)
5 (1)
0
1
1
6
3 (1)
1
0
1
2

77 (20)
64 (6)
30 (4)
27 (3)
22 (4)
17
12 (1)
12 (1)
9
8 (3)
4
3
2
15

Total

63

57

60

66

56

origin

302 (40) .13

Ministry of Origin for Chii Riyo: LDP Diet Members (Lower House)

Ministry of Origin

1953

1967

1972

1983

1993

Total

Ministry of Finance
Home Affairs
Agriculture
MITI
Foreign Affairs
Transport
Labor
Post & Telecommunication
Construction
Health & Welfare
Defense
Police
Education
other ministries/agencies
Total

5
24
5
4
6
2
0
4
0
0
0
0
1
0
51

14
14
5
7
3
5
2
1
0
3
1
0
0
1
56

19
14
4
4
1

19
11
5
4
3
2
4
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
51

19
6
7
5
3
0
1
0
5
2
0
1
0
1
50

76
69
26
24
16
13
10
8
7
7
2
2
1
3
264

4

3
3
1
1
1
0
0
1
56

Source: Kokkai Binran I 973 , 1983 , and I 993. Tabulations are done by the authors of the paper.
• Numbers in parentheses refer to hereditary politicians (second or third generation politicians).
** Nu mbers are too small todraw any substantia l interpretation.

.26
.09
.13
.11
.18
.00
.08
.08
.00
.37**
.00
.00
.00
.00

